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Conscious Intentions
The Social Creation Myth
Elisabeth Pacherie
What are intentions for? Do they have a primary purpose or function? If so, what
is this function? I start with a discussion of three existing approaches to these
questions. One account,  associated with Michael  Bratman’s planning theory of
agency, emphasizes the pragmatic functions of intentions: having the capacity to
form intentions allows us to place our actions more firmly under the control of de-
liberation and to coordinate our actions over time. A second account, inspired by
Elizabeth Anscombe’s theory of  intentions,  emphasizes their  epistemic  function
and their contribution to self-knowledge. A third account, developed by David
Velleman, suggests instead that the capacity for intentions may be an accident or
a spandrel, that is, a byproduct of some more general and fundamental endow-
ments of human nature. I argue that these accounts are at best partial and largely
overlook two important dimensions of intention. I introduce and motivate a further
pragmatic function of intentions, namely their role in the control and monitoring of
ongoing action and argue that acknowledging the existence and importance of this
function allows us to plug gaps in these accounts. I further argue that this prag-
matic function of intentions plays a crucial role in contexts of joint action where
agents must align their representations in order to coordinate their actions to-
wards a joint goal. I speculate that a capacity for conscious control might have
become established because of the role it served in solving inter-agent coordina-
tion problems in social contexts and because of the benefit conferred by the forms
of cooperation it thus made possible.
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1 Introduction
What are conscious intentions  for?  What do
we gain from having a capacity for intentions
as opposed to simply a capacity for desire-be-
lief motivation? Do intentions have a function
not just in the sense that they have a causal
role but in the normative sense in which hav-
ing this function confers benefits on intention-
forming  creatures  that  explain  why  these
creatures  have this  capacity.  In other  words,
do  intentions  have  a  teleofunction?  Is  there
something they are for? And if so, what is this
teleofunction?
Roughly, the notion of intention is that of
a  mental  state  that  represents  a  goal  (and
means  to  that  goal)  and  contributes  through
the  guidance  and  control  of  behavior  to  the
realization of what it represents. Thus, my in-
tending to go to my office will control and guide
my behavior (e.g., leaving my house, taking the
bus, walking from the bus stop to my office),
thus contributing to the realization of the goal
represented by the intention. Many philosophers
hold the view that if we do something intention-
ally, we must be aware of what we are doing.
Pacherie, E. (2015). Conscious Intentions - The Social Creation Myth.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 29(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570122 1 | 19
www.open-mind.net
Therefore, they consider that it is of the essence
of intentions to be conscious. I have argued else-
where (Pacherie 2008) in favor of a notion of
motor  intentions  whose  contents  may  not  al-
ways  be  accessible  to  consciousness.  On  my
view  then,  the  phrase  “conscious  intentions”
need not be pleonastic. Here, however, my focus
will be on intentions qua conscious states and I
will use “conscious intentions” and “intentions”
interchangeably.
In his 2007 paper, “What good is a will?”,
David Velleman considers the question whether
the human will, understood as the capacity for
(conscious) intentions, has a purpose or teleo-
function. He discusses two accounts that assume
that  the  will  has  a  purpose  but  disagree  on
what this purpose is.  On one account, associ-
ated with Bratman’s planning theory of agency,
the primary function of intentions is pragmatic:
having the capacity to form prior intentions is
good because it allows us to place our actions
more  firmly  under  the  control  of  deliberation
and to coordinate our actions over time. On the
other account, inspired by Anscombe’s theory of
intentions, the primary function of intentions is
epistemic.  Intentions  are  good  because  they
provide  self-knowledge:  an  intention  on  which
one  acts  provides  us  with  a  special  kind  of
knowledge of what one is doing. 
David  Velleman is  himself  skeptical  that
the  attitude  of  intention  has  a  teleofunction.
Rather, he suspects that the human will is an
accident or a spandrel, that is a byproduct of
some  more  general  and  fundamental  endow-
ments  of  human  nature.  Velleman  suggests,
however, that our hypotheses about the origins
of the will, including his own, must be closer to
creation myths than to scientific theories. Talk
of myths, of course, has both negative and pos-
itive connotations. On the negative side, myths
are,  if  not  downright  false  or  unfounded,  at
least  ultimately  unverifiable.  On  the  positive
side, myths are dramatization devices that serve
to highlight,  and make sense of,  the value or
function of a practice, of an institution or, in
the case at hand, of a cognitive capacity. Here, I
will offer my own creation myth for intentions,
a  myth  that  emphasizes  the  social  dimension
and social function of conscious intentions. The
main  claim I  will  defend  is  that  having  con-
scious intentions is a good thing in large part
because it facilitates coordination and coopera-
tion with others and because cooperation is it-
self fitness enhancing. My aim in proposing this
social creation myth is not to entirely displace
other creation myths, but rather to complement
them, to highlight an important facet of con-
scious intentions that traditional philosophy of
action has tended to neglect and to plug some
holes in the stories told in other myths. 
Here’s how I will proceed. In section  2, I
will present the two creation myths considered
and rejected by Velleman and discuss some dif-
ficulties they raise. In section  3, I will discuss
Velleman’s own creation myth. In section  4, I
will introduce and motivate a pragmatic func-
tion of intention largely overlooked by these cre-
ation  myths,  namely  their  role  in  the  control
and monitoring of ongoing actions. In section 5,
I will tell my own social creation myth. I’ll ar-
gue that this pragmatic function of intentions
plays a crucial role in contexts of joint action
where agents have to align their representations
in order to coordinate their actions towards a
joint  goal.  I’ll  speculate  that  the  main evolu-
tionary benefit conferred by a capacity for con-
scious intentions is that it enables a consider-
able increase in the possibilities for joint action
and cooperation. 
2 Two teleological creation myths
Velleman (2007) points out a methodological as-
sumption  common in  functionalist  psychology,
namely  the  assumption  that  our  attitudes  or
cognitive faculties have a function not just in
the sense that they have a causal role but in the
sense that they have a purpose, something they
are designed to do and thus ought to do. Func-
tions in this latter sense are commonly called
teleofunctions. This methodological assumption
needs not entail a belief in some intelligent de-
signer. Instead, it can be cashed out by appeal-
ing to evolutionary theory and to natural selec-
tion as a blind designer.  Typically,  the evolu-
tionary story goes like this: a trait has the tele-
ofunction of producing effect E just in case pro-
ducing this  effect  conferred some benefit  that
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contributed to the reproductive success  of  or-
ganisms endowed with the trait and, thereby, to
the propagation of the trait itself. This method-
ological assumption, when it guides our inquiry
into  intentions,  leads  us  to  take  the  question
what intentions are for, i.e., what purpose are
they meant to serve, as necessarily meaningful
and demanding an answer. 
Velleman discusses two teleological stories
meant to answer this question. He links the first
story to  Bratman’s theory of intentions (1987)
and the second to Anscombe’s theory (1963). I
start with the story inspired by Bratman’s the-
ory.
We  are,  in  Bratman’s  words,  planning
agents regularly making more or less complex
plans for the future and guiding our later con-
duct by these plans. This planning ability ap-
pears to be if not unique to humans at least
uniquely  developed  in  the  human  species.
People can, and frequently do, form intentions
concerning  actions  not  just  in  the  near  but
also  in  the  distant  future.  Why  should  we
bother  forming  future-directed  intentions?
What  purposes  can  it  serve?  What  benefits
does it bring us? What features of future-dir-
ected intentions allow them to serve these pur-
poses? 
Bratman  offers  two  complementary  an-
swers to that  challenge.  The first  stems from
the  fact  that  we  are  epistemically  limited
creatures: our cognitive resources for use in at-
tending to problems, gathering information, de-
liberating about options and determining likely
consequences are limited and these processes are
time consuming. As a result, if our actions were
influenced by deliberation only at the time of
action, this influence would be minimal as time
pressure isn’t conducive to careful deliberation.
Forming  future-directed  intentions  makes  ad-
vance  planning  possible,  freeing  us  from that
time pressure and allowing us to deploy the cog-
nitive resources needed for successful delibera-
tion. Second, intentions once formed commit us
to future courses of action, thus making the fu-
ture more predictable and making it possible for
agents to coordinate their  activities over time
and to coordinate them with the activities  of
other agents. Making deliberation and coordina-
tion  possible  are  thus  the  two  main  benefits
that accrue from a capacity to form future-dir-
ected intentions. 
What makes it possible for future-directed
intentions to yield these benefits is, according to
Bratman, the fact that they essentially involve
commitments to action. Bratman distinguishes
two dimensions of commitments: a volitional di-
mension  and  a  reasoning-centered  dimension.
The volitional dimension concerns the relation
of intention to action and can be characterized
by  saying  that  intentions  are  “conduct-con-
trolling  pro-attitudes”  (Bratman 1987,  p.  16).
In  other  words,  unless  something  unexpected
happens that forces me to revise my intention,
my intention  today  to  go  shopping  tomorrow
will control my conduct tomorrow. The reason-
ing-centered dimension of commitment is a com-
mitment to norms of practical rationality and is
most  directly  linked  to  planning.  What  is  at
stake here are the roles played by intentions in
the period between their initial formation and
their eventual execution. First, intentions have
what Bratman calls a characteristic stability or
inertia: once we have formed an intention to A,
we  will  not  normally  continue  to  deliberate
whether to A or not. In the absence of relevant
new information, the intention is rationally re-
quired to resist reconsideration: we will see the
matter as settled and continue to so intend until
the time of action. Intentions are thus terminat-
ors of practical reasoning about ends or goals.
Second, during this period between the forma-
tion  of  an  intention  and  action,  we  will  fre-
quently reason from such an intention to further
intentions. For instance, we reason from inten-
ded ends to intended means or to preliminary
steps.  When  we  first  form  an  intention,  our
plans are typically only partial, but if they are
to eventuate into action, they will need to be
filled in. Thus intentions are also prompters of
practical reasoning about means. Third, because
intentions are commitments to action, our in-
tentions  should  be  jointly  executable.  Finally,
taken together the volitional and the reasoning-
centered  dimensions  of  commitments  help  ex-
plain how intentions can promote coordination.
They provide support for the expectation that
agents will act as they intend to and these ex-
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pectations are central in turn to both inter- and
intra-personal coordination. In particular, this is
what motivates the rational agglomerativity re-
quirement  on  intentions,  i.e.,  the  requirement
that my intentions be jointly executable.
The benefits that accrue from a capacity
for intentions are,  ultimately,  pragmatic  bene-
fits. As  Bratman puts it, future-directed inten-
tions  “enable  us  to  avoid  being  merely  time-
slice-agents” (1987, p. 35). Instead of constantly
starting from scratch in our deliberations and
simply weighing current belief-desire reasons, in-
tentions allow us to become temporally exten-
ded agents. They provide a background frame-
work that allows us to expand the temporal ho-
rizon of our deliberation while at the same time
narrowing its scope to a limited set of options.
In so doing they contribute in the long run to
our  securing  greater  desire-satisfaction  than
simple desire-belief practical reasoning would.
Velleman (2007) sees three main problems
with Bratman’s pragmatic account of what in-
tentions are for. The first problem concerns the
status  and  role  of  present-directed  intentions.
On Bratman’s account, a future-directed inten-
tion requires a present-directed intention to con-
vey its motivational force and guide the action
once the time to act  is  seen to have arrived.
Bratman identifies no further role or function of
present-directed  intentions  beyond  conveying
the motivational potential of future-directed in-
tentions. At the same time, he insists that in-
tentional actions, whether or not they are pre-
ceded by future-directed intentions, always in-
volve present-directed intentions. This leaves us
with a potentially large class of spontaneous in-
tentional  actions  that  involve  present-directed
intentions but are not preceded by future-direc-
ted intentions.  These  intentions  do  not  incor-
porate the results of any prior deliberation, they
don’t set the stage for any further planning and
they don’t provide a basis for any coordination.
The first worry raised by Velleman is thus that
these intentions do not seem to serve any of the
pragmatic purposes that, on Bratman’s account,
constitute  the  raison  d’être  of  intentions.
Second,  Velleman  points  out  that  a  similar
worry arises for the intentions involved in vari-
ous cases of planning. He illustrates his point
with  a  voting  example.  He  argues  that  while
there may be good reasons for my starting to
think about my vote in advance, such as giving
me sufficient time to deliberate,  there doesn’t
seem to be any good reason for settling in ad-
vance of my arrival in the voting booth whom I
will  vote for.  On the contrary, settling in ad-
vance seems to carry potential costs, by making
me resistant to reconsideration, without procur-
ing any benefits, since the actual act of casting
my ballot doesn’t  require any particular prior
preparation. Thus, at least in these cases where
no  further  planning  is  needed  once  one  has
settled on a course of action, it is unclear what
purpose settling in advance could serve. 
Velleman’s  third  worry  relates  to  Brat-
man’s view that intention need not imply belief.
Bratman indeed maintains that “there need be
no irrationality in intending to A and yet still
not believing one will”,  but that,  in contrast,
“there will normally be irrationality in intend-
ing to A and believing one will not A” (1987, p.
38). According to Velleman, this view of Brat-
man’s leaves much of his functional account of
intentions  unmotivated.  In  particular,  it  be-
comes unclear why in intending to A, an agent
should be rationally required to identify means
of  A-ing  or  to  rationally  constrain  her  sub-
sequent  practical  reasoning  by  ruling  out  op-
tions inconsistent with her  A-ing, if she is ag-
nostic whether she will in fact carry out her in-
tention.  Similarly,  it  becomes unclear  why we
should impose  an  agglomerativity  requirement
on intentions. As Velleman points out, it is un-
clear  why intentions should be jointly execut-
able if the agent can be agnostic as to whether
they will be executed. 
In my view, Velleman’s third worry is ex-
aggerated.  Firstly,  while  Bratman  indeed
maintains that an intention to A does not re-
quire belief that one will  A, he insists at the
same  time  that  an  intention  to  A normally
supports the belief that one will  A. Secondly,
Bratman  also  makes  the  point  that  agnosti-
cism about whether one will act as intended
does not directly undermine coherent planning
but makes it more complex, leading us to form
conditional intentions and plans for both fail-
ure and success to act as intended. Of course,
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the viability of  such a move depends on ag-
nosticism being the exception rather than the
rule; otherwise, we would have an unmanage-
able  proliferation of  conditional  branching in
our plans. 
Velleman’s  first  and  second  worries  run
deeper.  If  the only purposes  of  intentions are
the  pragmatic  functions  Bratman  identifies,
then there appear to be many instances where
intentions don’t serve these purposes or where
serving them is actually counterproductive. This
may be taken to indicate that  Bratman’s  ac-
count is incomplete and that he has overlooked
some of the functions intentions serve. This line
of thought can be pursued in two different dir-
ections.  On  the  one  hand,  we  may  try  to
identify further pragmatic functions that inten-
tions,  including  present-directed  intentions,
could serve; on the other hand, we may look for
non-pragmatic  functions  that  intentions  could
serve. As we will now see, Velleman explores the
second option, turning to Anscombe’s theory of
intentions in search of an answer. In contrast,
what I will do myself later in this paper is ex-
plore the first option, giving it a social twist.
Velleman  argues  that  Bratman’s  account
of intentions misses an important function of in-
tention, a function that is  a central theme in
Anscombe’s theory of intention. In her book In-
tention (1963),  she  argues  that  intentions
provide us with a special kind of self-knowledge
and claims that this knowledge is special in two
ways. It is knowledge of our own intentional ac-
tions, i.e., knowledge not just of what one is at-
tempting to do, but of what one is actually do-
ing,  and  it  is  knowledge  without  observation.
Much philosophical ink has been spilled on how
exactly these two claims should be interpreted.
Following Falvey (2000), Velleman favors a reli-
abilist interpretation of these claims. According
to this interpretation, knowledge of one’s own
intentional actions is non-observational because
it is given by the content of our intentions and
intentions  in  turn  normally  constitute  (prac-
tical) knowledge of our own intentional actions
because they reliably cause the facts that make
them true.  Note  also,  that  on  this  reliabilist
reading, Anscombe’s claim is not that the con-
tent of our intentions provides us with infallible
knowledge of what we are doing. To say that
there  normally  exists  a  reliable  connection
between our intentions and actions is not to say
that there cannot be cases when this connection
does not obtain. However, as Velleman emphas-
izes, on Anscombe’s account, failures of reliabil-
ity undermine not just the epistemic status of
intentions, they also undermine the intentional-
ity of actions. If my intending to A does not re-
liably cause my  A-ing, then, on the one hand,
my intending to  A will  not amount to know-
ledge that I am A-ing and, on the other hand,
my A-ing when it happens will be an accident
rather than an intentional action. According to
Anscombe,  intentional  actions  are  those  “to
which the question ‘Why?’ is given application”
(1963, p. 9) and having practical knowledge is
knowing a description of what one is doing, has
done  or  is  proposing  to  do  that  answers  the
question  “Why?”.  Thus,  the  basic  epistemic
function of  intentions is  to provide us with a
form  of  self-knowledge  and  self-understanding
qua intentional agents. 
According to Velleman, acknowledging this
epistemic function of  intentions does much to
alleviate the worries raised by Bratman’s prac-
tical account. With respect to the first worry –
that  present-directed  intentions  serve  no  pur-
pose – one can now argue that while they might
serve  no practical  purpose  they still  serve  an
epistemic function. With respect to the second
worry – that on many occasions making one’s
mind in advance serves no pragmatic purpose –,
one can now reply that in matters that are im-
portant  to  one’s  self-conception,  uncertainty
about one’s future behavior is both uncomfort-
able and undesirable and that forming an inten-
tion allows us to gain self-knowledge and avoid
this  mental  discomfort.  With  respect  to  the
third worry – that absent a strong enough con-
nection between intention and belief, it is un-
clear  why intentions should be subject to the
practical  rationality  requirements  emphasized
by Bratman–, Anscombe’s theory regarding the
epistemic function of intentions lets us see how
the epistemic  role  of  intentions could support
their pragmatic functions. 
The story as told so far suggests that we
should  think  of  the  epistemic  and  pragmatic
Pacherie, E. (2015). Conscious Intentions - The Social Creation Myth.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 29(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570122 5 | 19
www.open-mind.net
functions of intentions as complementary. How-
ever, as Velleman points out, it still  leaves us
with two possible hypotheses or creation myths
about the origin and ultimate purpose of inten-
tions. On the pragmatic creation myth, the ulti-
mate purpose of intentions would be pragmatic
and their epistemic function would be subservi-
ent to their pragmatic functions, but may occa-
sionally exemplify re-purposing: “That is, inten-
tion might have been designed to embody self-
knowledge for the sake of facilitation coordina-
tion, but it might then be used on occasion, for
the sake of self-knowledge alone, when coordina-
tion isn’t  necessary” (Velleman 2007,  p.  208).
By  contrast,  on  the  epistemic  creation  myth,
the ultimate purpose of  intentions may be to
embody self-knowledge, and the pragmatic func-
tions of intentions might have emerged simply
as a fortuitous by-product of self-knowledge. 
While  Velleman  has  more  sympathy  for
the epistemic than for the pragmatic creation
myth, he thinks both should ultimately be re-
jected. In the next section, I’ll consider his reas-
ons for rejecting them, discuss the alternative
story he proposes, and advance my own reasons
for being skeptical about this story.
3 Velleman’s spandrel
Despite their differences, the epistemic and the
pragmatic creation myths rest on the common
assumption that intentions have a teleofunction,
some  ultimate  purpose  they  are  designed  to
serve. Velleman thinks it is more plausible that
their  existence  is  an  accident,  that  is  to  say,
that they are the byproduct of some more gen-
eral  endowments  of  human  nature.  In  other
words, Velleman is tempted to think of the hu-
man  will  as,  in  Gould &  Lewontin’s  phrase
(1979),  a  spandrel,  a  feature  formed  not  by
design but as an accidental byproduct of some
other  designed feature  or  features.  This  leads
him  to  be  skeptical  about  both  teleological
myths. In telling his own creation myth, Velle-
man pursues two aims. His first aim is to show
that the assumption behind the two teleological
myths can be dispensed with. His second aim is
to show that the accident that led to the emer-
gence of the human will more closely approxim-
ates the epistemic than the pragmatic creation
myth. 
Velleman’s own account of intentions char-
acterizes them as an agent’s commitment to the
truth of some act-description of his or her forth-
coming behavior  that reliably causes this  act-
description to come true.  He argues that this
account of intentions “posits nothing more than
the  predictable  consequences  of  two  motiva-
tional  states  whose  utility  in  the  design  of  a
creature is far more general than that of the hu-
man  will”  (Velleman 2007,  p.  211).  In  other
words, the human will is a spandrel, a feature
arising from the accidental confluence of two de-
signed features.  What are these two features?
The  first,  according  to  Velleman,  is  curiosity,
defined  as  the  creature’s  drive  to  understand
what goes on in its environment. The second is
self-awareness, through which the creature real-
izes that it is part of its environment and that
its own behavior is part of what goes on in this
environment.  Self-awareness  thus  allows  a
creature to acquire an objective conception of
itself. A creature that is both curious and self-
aware will in turn be driven to understand its
own behavior, that is, to understand “how the
egocentrically conceived world of doing things is
connected to the objectively conceived world of
things understood” (Velleman 2007, p. 211). In
understanding this, it will have acquired the ca-
pacity for intentions. 
We can now see why Velleman thinks his
own creation myth has more affinities with the
epistemic  than  with  the  pragmatic  creation
myth. Curiosity is an epistemic drive and self-
awareness  is  an  epistemic  capacity.  As  their
byproduct,  the capacity for intentions inherits
this essential epistemic dimension. We can also
understand why he means his own myth as an
antidote to the methodological assumption in-
herent to the idea that intentions serve a spe-
cific teleofunction. Curiosity and self-awareness
are, Velleman claims, designed for far more gen-
eral purposes than that of the human will. 
I think, however, that this is also where the
creation myth told by Velleman reaches its limits.
Important questions are left unanswered: What
are these more general purposes served by curios-
ity and self-awareness? What good is curiosity?
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What good is self-awareness? Unless he is willing
to consider the will as a spandrel of spandrels,
Velleman  owes  us  answers  to  these  questions.
From an evolutionary point of view, it is unclear
what benefits knowledge of their environment and
knowledge of themselves could confer on creatures
endowed with curiosity and self-awareness unless
this knowledge found some behavioral expression.
It isn’t too difficult to see how a better under-
standing of their environment can promote more
effective behavior, enhance the satisfaction of de-
sires and needs, and ultimately have a differential
impact on reproductive success in creatures en-
dowed with curiosity. One should note, however,
that pushing Velleman’s story one step further in
his  direction has the  effect  of  undermining his
claim that his own myth has strong affinities with
the epistemic creation myth for it suggests that
the epistemic function of curiosity is ancillary to
its pragmatic function, rather than the reverse. 
It is less obvious how we should answer the
question what good is self-awareness, what pur-
poses it is designed for. My aim in the next two
sections will be to remove two obstacles that pre-
vent us from looking in the right direction for an
answer to this question. The first obstacle lies in
the fact that philosophers have tended to neglect
an  important  pragmatic  function  of  intentions.
Thus,  Velleman notes,  rightly in my view, that
Bratman’s account of the pragmatic functions of
intentions leaves many present-directed intentions
without a purpose. However, rather than looking
for some further pragmatic purpose intentions may
serve, beyond scheduling deliberation and enhan-
cing action coordination over time, Velleman turns
his attention to epistemic functions. I will argue in
section 4 that they both neglect a further import-
ant pragmatic function of intentions, namely their
role in the online monitoring and control of action.
The second obstacle lies in the fact that one cent-
ral feature that makes us human, our deep social-
ity, is either ignored or at best a peripheral con-
cern  in  philosophical  accounts  of  intentions.  Of
course, I am not denying the obvious: many philo-
sophers, and Bratman prominently among them,
have explored joint agency and collective intention-
ality. Typically, however, their focus has been on
whether or not joint agency should be seen as con-
tinuous  with  individual  agency  and  thus  on
whether  or  not  the  conceptual  framework  de-
veloped to account for individual intentions could
be fruitfully extended to shared intentions.1 Rarely
if ever, however, do they consider the possibility
that shared intentions may shed light on some of
the features and functions of individual intentions.
In section 5, I will argue that the control and mon-
itoring function of intentions plays a crucial role in
contexts of joint action. I will further argue that
this function might indeed be the primary function
of intentions and might have become established
because of the role it serves in solving the coordin-
ation problems that arise in joint action and be-
cause of the benefit thus conferred on creatures
capable of solving these coordination problems.
4 Control: A further pragmatic function of
intentions
Bratman (1987) considers future-directed inten-
tions as the central case of intending to act and
contrasts this approach to intention with an al-
ternative approach that gives priority to imme-
diate intentions or intentions in action. He notes
that this second approach naturally leads to the
idea  that  intentions  in  action  reduce  to  com-
plexes  of  beliefs  and  desires,  i.e.,  that  what
makes it the case that an agent acts with a cer-
tain intentions are simply facts about the rela-
tion between the agent’s actions and his beliefs
and desires, and that this in turn tempts us into
thinking that the same reductive strategy can
be extended to future-directed intentions..2 Fo-
cusing instead on future-directed intentions as
the  central  case  of  intending  allows  us  to
identify functions of intentions that cannot eas-
ily  be  accommodated  within  a  belief-desire
model  and thus  makes  the  reductive  strategy
much  less  appealing.  This  would  account  for
Bratman’s emphasis on the deliberative and co-
ordination functions of intentions. The flip side
of the coin, however, is that present-directed in-
tentions are then seen as little more than trans-
mission belts needed to convey the motivational
force of future-directed intentions. As noted by
1 See e.g., Bratman (2014) for a positive answer to these questions and
Gilbert (1992, 2009) for a negative answer.
2 See for instance  Davidson (1980, Essay 1) and Goldman (1970) for
belief-desire reductive models of intentions.
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Velleman, this leaves us with a potentially large
class  of  actions  where  present-directed  inten-
tions appear to have no role to play, namely all
these actions that are intentional yet not pre-
ceded by future-directed intentions.  What be-
lief-desire  reductive approaches,  Bratman’s ac-
count and Velleman’s account all seem to over-
look is a specific pragmatic function of  inten-
tions  in  action  or  present-directed  intentions,
namely their role in the guidance, control and
monitoring of action execution. 
Harry Frankfurt (1978)  was  one  of  the
first philosophers to criticize this oversight and
insist on the importance of this pragmatic func-
tion of intentions. He emphasized that “a per-
son must be in some particular relation to the
movements  of  his  body  during  the  period  of
time in which he is presumed to be performing
an action” (Frankfurt 1978, p. 157) and charac-
terized this relation as one of guidance. Other
philosophers have since shared his insight. For
instance, Brand (1984), Bishop (1989) and Mele
(1992) all insist that an adequate account of in-
tentions  should  incorporate  the  guiding  and
monitoring roles of intentions in order to prop-
erly capture the close and continuous connec-
tion between intention and ongoing action.
The  main  reason  why  this  connection
between  intention  and  ongoing  action  is
needed is that human agents are neither infal-
lible nor omniscient. Their expectations about
the  circumstances  in  which  the  action  is  to
take place may not always be correct and they
may fail to anticipate some of the relevant as-
pects  of  the  situation  of  action.  In  other
words, their situational beliefs may be incor-
rect or incomplete. The same goes for their in-
strumental beliefs. Suppose, for instance, that
I  intend  to  visit  a  colleague  in  her  office.  I
may be wrong in thinking that this is the door
to  her  office  (incorrect  situational  belief)  or
unsure which door is her office door (lack of
relevant  situational  belief).  Similarly,  I  may
also be wrong in thinking that I should pull
the door to open it (incorrect instrumental be-
lief) or unsure whether to push or pull (lack of
relevant instrumental belief). If intentions are
to  reliably  produce  behavior  matching  their
representational content (e.g., visiting my col-
league in  her  office),  they should have some
flexibility  and  incorporate  monitoring  pro-
cesses to detect deviations that jeopardize the
success of the action and correction processes
to trigger compensatory activity.
This  emphasis  on  control  finds  a  strong
echo in the literature on motor cognition (see,
e.g., Jeannerod 1997, 2006). Indeed, it is in this
literature  that  we  can  find  the  most  precise
characterization of the monitoring and control
functions of intentions and of the mechanisms
that support them. According to the very influ-
ential  internal  model theory of  motor control,
motor control strategies are based on the coup-
ling  of  two  types  of  internal  models:  inverse
models and forward models (Frith et al. 2000;
Jordan & Wolpert 1999; Wolpert 1997). Inverse
models  compute  the  motor commands needed
for achieving a desired state given the current
state of the system and of the environment. An
efference copy of these commands is fed to for-
ward models, whose role is to make predictions
about  the  consequences  of  the  execution  of
these  commands.  The  control  of  action  is
thought to depend on the coupling of  inverse
and forward models through a series of compar-
ators: error signals arising from the comparison
of desired, predicted, and actual states (monit-
oring) are used for various kinds of regulation
(control). In particular, they can be used to cor-
rect and adjust the ongoing action in the face of
perturbations, as well as to update both inverse
and  forward  models  to  improve  their  future
functioning. 
Recent experimental work in motor cogni-
tion also suggests, however, that much of action
control  is  automatic  and  proceeds  independ-
ently of conscious awareness. For instance, in an
experiment (Castiello et  al. 1991) participants
were asked to reach for and grasp a target as
quickly as possible and their hand trajectories
were recorded. On some trials, though, the tar-
get  shifted  position  after  the  movement  had
started. When this happened, participants were
instructed to correct their movement in order to
reach accurately for the target and to signal the
time  at  which  they  became  aware  of  its  dis-
placement by shouting “Tah!”. The experiment
showed that the participants started correcting
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their movements more than 300ms before they
signaled awareness of  the target displacement.
A subsequent study (Pisella et al. 2000) was es-
pecially instructive. In a first experiment they
used a similar paradigm but introduced a condi-
tion where participants were requested to inter-
rupt their movement when the target changed
location.  Despite  the  instruction,  the  parti-
cipants could not prevent themselves from cor-
recting their movements instead of stopping for
a  good  200  ms.  In  contrast,  however,  in  a
second experiment green and red targets were
presented  simultaneously  in  the  two  positions
and the participants’ task was to point at the
green one. On some trials, the color of the two
targets could be unexpectedly interchanged at
movement  onset.  When  this  happened,  one
group of  participants  was  instructed  to  inter-
rupt  their  ongoing  movement  and  the  other
group  to  correct  it.  In  contrast  to  what
happened in the first experiment, no automatic
corrective  movements  were  observed  in  the
group  instructed  to  interrupt  their  movement
and in the other group corrections involved a
significant  increase  in  movement  time.  Thus,
these  results  suggest  that  while  corrections
made in response to spatial  perturbations are
under automatic control, corrections in response
to  chromatic  perturbations  require  intentional
control. 
On the one hand, the mere fact that some
or much of action control can be automatic is not
a sufficient reason to deny a control function to
intentions. The experimental studies presented in
the previous paragraph suggest that action con-
trol can indeed operate automatically and outside
of conscious awareness and that when there is a
conflict between automatic and intentional con-
trol, automatic control may take precedence over
intentional control. Yet, they also provide evid-
ence that some corrections cannot be carried out
automatically but depend on intentional control.
On the other hand, the mere fact that intentional
control seems needed to compensate for chromatic
perturbations may not provide sufficient ground
for considering that the intentional control of ac-
tion execution is a central function of intentions.
One would want a more systematic account of the
respective roles of automatic and intentional con-
trol. Recent developments of the internal model
approach to motor control may constitute a useful
guide. 
While the internal model approach to mo-
tor control was initially introduced to account
for fine-grained aspects of motor control, more
recent versions of this approach emphasize the
hierarchical nature of motor control (Hamilton
&  Grafton 2007;  Jeannerod 1997;  Kilner et al.
2007). They propose that internal inverse and
forward models are arranged in a hierarchy and
that error signals generated at one level of the
hierarchy can propagate to the next level when
correction mechanisms at this level are not able
to  make  the  necessary  compensations.  I  have
suggested  elsewhere  (Pacherie 2008)  that  one
can distinguish three broad levels in an action
specification hierarchy. At the highest level, ac-
tion representations represent the whole action
as a unit, in terms of its overarching goal and of
the  sequence  of  steps  or  subgoals  needed  to
achieve that goal. At this level, the action may
still be represented in a rather abstract format.
The second level is concerned with the imple-
mentation of each step in the action plan and
involves selecting an appropriate motor program
given  the  immediate  goal  and  contextual  in-
formation about the current state of the agent
and  the  current  state  of  its  environment.  In
other words, processes at this level are in charge
of anchoring the successive steps of the action
plan in  the  current  situation  and of  selecting
appropriate  motor  programs.  Finally,  once  a
motor program has been selected, the exact val-
ues of its parameters must still be set. This is
done at the third level, where incoming sensory
information about external constraints is  used
to specify these values. 
Acknowledging  the  existence  of  different
levels of action control corresponding to these
different levels in the action specification hier-
archy may allow us to accommodate both auto-
matic and intentional action control processes.
As long as error signals can be reduced by auto-
matic  corrections  made at  lower  levels  in  the
hierarchy, there is no need for the intervention
of intentional  control.  However,  there are two
classes  of  cases  where  automatic  corrections
may not be sufficient to put an action back on
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track.  First,  important  external  perturbations
can lead to discrepancies that are too large to
be automatically compensated. In such a case,
error  signals  would  propagate  upwards,  we
would become aware of them and shift to a con-
scious,  intentional  compensation  strategy.
Second,  in  some  instances  there  may also  be
discrepancies in the ways the action is or can be
specified at different levels of the action repres-
entation  hierarchy  (inter-level  representational
misalignment). Thus, the study by Pisella and
colleagues (Pisella et al. 2000) suggests that ac-
tion specification at the sensorimotor level does
not encode chromatic information and uses spa-
tial information as a proxy for it. When chro-
matic information and spatial information vary
independently, as they do in one of the condi-
tions of the experiment, representations at dif-
ferent levels  of  the action representation hier-
archy become misaligned and the intervention of
conscious control becomes necessary to realign
them. 
Importantly, on this conception of inten-
tional  control  and  as  Frankfurt  had  already
noted, what is essential for actions to be in-
tentionally  controlled  is  not  that  intentional
control processes actually affect their  course,
but that these control mechanisms would have
intervened to adjust the action had the need
arisen. In other words, an action may be in-
tentionally  controlled even though automatic
rather than voluntary control mechanisms in-
tervene to compensate for deviations, provided
these  voluntary  control  mechanisms  would
have  kicked  in,  had  automatic  corrections
proved insufficient. 
Even more importantly, if action control is
an  essential  function  of  intentions,  then  we
should  stop  thinking  of  intentions  as  simply
mental  representations  of  goals  somehow trig-
gering motor processes that, if everything goes
well, will yield the desired outcome. Rather, we
should  think  of  monitoring  and  control  pro-
cesses as intrinsic to intentions, that is, of inten-
tions as encompassing not just representations
of goals but also a specific set of monitoring and
control processes organizing and structuring the
motor processes that themselves generate move-
ments. 
In this section, I argued for the idea that
the control of action execution is an important
pragmatic function of intentions. Acknowledging
the existence  and importance  of  this  function
allows us to plug gaps  in  the creation  myths
considered earlier. First, it allows us to attrib-
ute a specific pragmatic function to present-dir-
ected intentions rather than considering them as
mere transmission belts in charge of conveying
the motivational force of future-directed inten-
tions. We can thus assuage one of the main wor-
ries raised by Velleman against Bratman’s prag-
matic account of intentions and the pragmatic
creation  myth  derived  from  it.  Second,
Anscombe’s  and Velleman’s  accounts of  inten-
tions both assume that intentions reliably cause
behavior  that  matches  their  representational
content. Human agents, however, are neither in-
fallible nor omniscient. Their situational and in-
strumental beliefs can be incorrect or they can
lack  situational  and  instrumental  beliefs  that
are relevant to the successful execution of their
intentions.  Thus,  the  reliability  demanded  by
Anscombe’s and Velleman’s accounts largely de-
pends on our having powerful and flexible con-
trol  processes  allowing  us  to  put  our  actions
back on track when perturbations deviate their
course. 
One may agree that the conscious control
of individual action is a function of intention in
the sense that intentions have this causal role,
but still be skeptical that this is the role inten-
tions  are  designed  for,  or  to  put  it  in  other
words, that it is  a teleofunction of intentions.
Thus, one could argue that very large external
perturbations are rare and that inter-level rep-
resentational  misalignment  is  the  exception
rather than the rule. If so, most of action con-
trol would be automatic anyway and intentional
action  control  would  play at  best  a  marginal
role. It would therefore be unlikely to confer on
intention-forming  creatures  benefits  important
enough to warrant the claim that intentions are
designed for action control. As I have tried to
argue in this section, the benefits conferred by
online conscious control over actions are not as
negligible as this deflationary view implies. In
addition,  I  think we  can  build  a  very  strong
case  that  conscious action control  confers  im-
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portant  benefits if  we consider  joint  activities
rather  than  just  individual  actions.  Acting
jointly  demands  that  we  solve  coordination
problems that do not arise (or arise only in a
very attenuated form) in individual action. In
what follows, I will argue that online conscious
control plays a crucial role in solving these co-
ordination  problems.  I  will  further  speculate
that conscious online control over actions might
indeed have become established as the primary
function  of  intentions  because  of  the  role  it
served  in  solving  these  coordination  problems
and  because  of  the  benefit  this  conferred  on
creatures capable of solving these coordination
problems and thus of acting jointly in an effi-
cient and flexible way.
5 The social creation myth
Humans have been characterized as the ultra-
cooperative  species  (Tomasello 2009,  2011).
This ultra-cooperativeness has made us one of
the most successful species on earth, spreading
all over the planet, creating and developing cul-
tural artifacts and practices that are themselves
culturally  transmitted  and  accumulate  over
time, thus giving us a further competitive edge
over other species. According to Tomasello, un-
derlying humans’ ultra-cooperativeness are a set
of  species-unique  skills  and  motivations  for
shared intentionality, involving “such things as
the ability and motivation to form shared goals
and  intentions  with  others  in  collaborative
activities,  and  the  ability  and  motivation  to
share experience with others via joint attention,
cooperative  communication,  and  teaching”
(2011, p. 6). 
The gist of the social creation myth I am
proposing in this section is that the main be-
nefits associated with intentions and with the
kind  of  control  over  actions  they  make  pos-
sible arise in social cooperative contexts where
agents  have  to  coordinate  their  actions  to
achieve a shared goal. I start with an examin-
ation of the special demands for coordination
acting jointly with others creates. I then ex-
plain how the capacity to form conscious in-
tentions is a crucial component of our ability
to meet these demands. 
Successful joint action depends on the effi-
cient coordination of participant agents’ goals, in-
tentions,  plans,  and  actions.  As  I  argued  else-
where  (Pacherie 2012),  it  is  not  enough  that
agents  control  their  own  actions,  i.e.,  correctly
predict their effects, monitor their execution and
make adjustments if needed. They must also co-
ordinate  their  actions  with  those  of  their  co-
agents so as to achieve their joint goal. For that
they must monitor their partner’s intentions and
actions, predict their expected consequences and
use these predictions to adjust what they are do-
ing to what their partners are doing. The implica-
tion of these processes, however, is not unique to
joint action nor enough to promote their success.
In competitive contexts they also play an import-
ant role. For instance, in a fight being able to an-
ticipate your opponent’s moves and to act accord-
ingly is also crucial. What is furthermore required
in the case of joint action is that co-agents share
a goal and understand the combined impact of
their  respective intentions and actions on their
joint goal and adjust them accordingly. In com-
petitive contexts, an agent should typically aim at
predicting  his  opponents’  moves,  while  at  the
same time endeavoring to make his own moves
unpredictable to his opponents. In contrast, in co-
operative contexts mutual predictability must be
achieved  for  efficient  coordination  towards  a
shared goal to be possible. Agents should be able
to align their representations of what themselves
and their partners are doing and of how these ac-
tions together contribute to the shared goal. 
Various  forms  of  uncertainty  can  under-
mine  mutual  predictability,  the  alignment  of
representations  and  hence  coordination.  They
can be  organized  into  three  broad categories.
The first category involves motivational uncer-
tainty: we can be unsure how convergent a po-
tential partner’s interests are with our own in-
terests and thus unsure whether there are goals
we share and can promote together. The second
category involves instrumental uncertainty: even
assuming that we share a goal, we can be un-
sure what we should do to achieve that goal, or,
if we have a plan, unsure how roles should be
distributed among us, or, yet, unsure when and
where  we  should  act.  The  third  category  in-
volves common ground uncertainty: we can be
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unsure how much of what is relevant to our de-
ciding on a joint goal,  planning for that goal
and executing our plan is  common ground or
mutually manifest to us. 
Philosophical accounts of joint agency, in-
cluding  Bratman’s (2009,  2014) do not ignore
these  challenges  but  they  are  essentially  con-
cerned  with  high-level  processes  involved  in
making decisions about whether or not to act
together and in advance planning. Their focus is
on the coordination of agent’s intentions prior
to acting and they pay little heed to the pro-
cesses enabling people to coordinate during ac-
tion execution. In contrast, in the last decade,
cognitive  scientists  have  investigated  joint  ac-
tion by focusing on lower-level online coordina-
tion  processes  in  relatively  simple  joint  tasks
and on the factors that affect these coordination
processes.  In  what  follows,  I  will  argue  that
there are important limitations to what these
advance and online coordination processes can
achieve  and  that  high-level  online  intentional
control  is  crucial  to  overcoming  these  limita-
tions. First, however, let us consider the main
characteristics  of  the  two sets  of  coordination
processes philosophers and psychologists typic-
ally focus on. 
Bratman’s account of shared intentions is
a good illustration of the way philosophical ac-
counts approach coordination issues in joint ac-
tion. In addition, its explicitness makes it pos-
sible to see clearly what advance coordination
involves and how it is achieved. 
Bratman (2009) proposes that shared in-
tention involves the following conditions as its
main building blocks:
1. Intentions on the part of each in favor of the
joint activity.
2. Interlocking intentions: each intends that the
joint activity go in part by way of the relev-
ant intentions of each of the participants.
3. Intentions in favor of meshing subplans: each
intends  that  the  joint  activity  proceed  by
way of subplans of the participants that are
co-realizable and can be consistently agglom-
erated.
4. Disposition to help if needed: given that the
contribution of the other participants to the
joint  activity is  part of  what each intends,
and given the demands of means-end coher-
ence and of consistency that apply to inten-
tions, each is under rational pressure to help
others fulfill their role if needed.
5. Interdependence  in  the  persistence  of  each
participant’s relevant intention: each believes
that the persistence of the other participants’
intention  in  favor  of  the  joint  activity  de-
pends on the persistence of his own and vice-
versa. 
6. Joint-action-tracking  mutual  responsiveness:
each is responsive to each in relevant subsidi-
ary  intentions  and in  relevant  actions  in  a
way that tracks the joint action.
7. Common knowledge among all participants of
all these conditions.
Let  me offer  some comments  on  these  condi-
tions. First, Bratman offers these conditions as
a set of sufficient conditions for a shared inten-
tion, leaving it open that shared intentions may
be realized in other ways, in particular in cases
of joint activities involving institutions. Second,
conditions (1),  (2) and (5) are meant to deal
with motivational uncertainty. Bratman points
out that the concept of a joint activity that fig-
ures  in  the  contents  of  the  intentions  in  (1)
should be understood in a way that is neutral
with respect to shared intentionality. So condi-
tion (1) only insures that agents share goals in a
weak sense of the notion. Rather it is condition
(2) that is in charge of insuring that the motiv-
ational states of the agents align in the way re-
quired for  joint  cooperative  activity:  it  is  the
fact  that  for  each  participant,  the  content  of
their  intention refers to the role of the inten-
tions of  other  participants that,  for  Bratman,
captures  the  intentional  jointness  of  their  ac-
tions. Condition (5) in turn specifies how these
motivations stay aligned. Third, conditions (3),
(4) and (6) relate to means-end uncertainty and
are meant to reduce it. According to Bratman,
they can be derived from condition (2) taken to-
gether  with the norms of  practical  rationality
that  already  govern  individual  planning  and
acting. Bratman’s key idea is that the interlock-
ing and interdependent intentions of individual
participants,  in  responding  to  the  norms  of
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practical rationality governing individual plan-
ning agency, will also respond to the norms of
social agglomeration and consistency, social co-
herence  and  social  stability  shared  intentions
are subject to. This would involve, in Bratman’s
terms, commitments to mutual compatibility of
relevant sub-plans, commitments to mutual sup-
port, and joint-action tracking mutual respons-
iveness. Finally, the function of condition (7) is,
rather obviously, to reduce common ground un-
certainty. 
Bratman’s  basic  idea  is  thus  that  this
structure of interlocking and interdependent in-
tentions, when it functions properly, frames rel-
evant  bargaining  and  shared  deliberation  and
thus supports and guides coordinated planning
and  action  in  pursuit  of  the  intended  shared
activity. Unsurprisingly, since Bratman’s theory
of joint agency is continuous with his planning
theory of individual intentions, it is in virtue of
the pragmatic functions intentions already serve
in the individual action case that the interlock-
ing and interdependent intentions of individual
participants  can  also  support  coordination  in
the joint action case. 
While Bratman, in his condition (6), stip-
ulates that agents should be mutually respons-
ive not just in their relevant intentions and sub-
sidiary intentions but also in relevant actions in
a way that tracks the joint action, his account
doesn’t tell us by what means mutual respons-
iveness  in  action  is  achieved.  To  know  more
about this, we have to turn our attention to re-
cent psychological work on joint agency. In con-
trast to philosophical approaches, cognitive psy-
chology studies of joint action typically focus on
the perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes
that enable individuals to coordinate their ac-
tions with others online. 
Knoblich and colleagues  (Knoblich et  al.
2011) distinguish between two broad categories
of  coordination  processes,  emergent  and
planned. In emergent coordination, coordinated
behavior occurs due to perception-action coup-
lings that make multiple individuals act in sim-
ilar ways. One source of emergent coordination
is entrainment, the process of synchronizing two
or more actors’ rhythmic behaviors with respect
to phase (e.g., Richardson et al. 2007). A second
source of emergent coordination is perception-
action matching, whereby observed actions are
matched onto the observer’s own action reper-
toire and can induce the same action tendencies
in  different  agents  who observe  one  another’s
actions (Jeannerod 1999; Prinz 1997; Rizzolatti
&  Sinigaglia 2010;  Knoblich &  Sebanz 2008).
Importantly, emergent forms of coordination are
independent  of  any  joint  plans  or  common
knowledge,  which  may  be  altogether  absent.
They support basic forms of motor and repres-
entational alignment that can facilitate mutual
responsiveness in action, but they do not ensure
that the agent’s actions track a joint goal. In-
deed, the successful performance of some joint
actions  may require  that  these  automatic  co-
ordination processes be inhibited. For instance,
the performance of composer Steve Reich’s fam-
ous piece, Drumming, based on the technique of
phasing, requires the musicians to play the same
rhythmic pattern out of sync. 
In planned coordination, agents plan their
own actions  in  relation  to  the joint  goal  and
also to some extent to their partners’ actions.
As emphasized by Knoblich et al. (2011), shared
task representations play an important role in
planned  coordination.  Shared  task  representa-
tions do not only specify in advance what the
respective  tasks  of  each  of  the  co-agents  are,
they also provide control structures that allow
agents to monitor and predict what their part-
ners are doing, thus enabling interpersonal co-
ordination  in  real  time.  Empirical  evidence
shows that having shared task representations
influences  perceptual  information  processing,
action monitoring, control and prediction dur-
ing the ensuing interaction (Heed et al. 2010;
Schuch & Tipper 2007; Sebanz et al. 2006; Tsai
et al. 2006).  Furthermore, several studies (Se-
banz et al. 2005; Sebanz et al. 2006) have shown
that actors may form shared representations of
tasks quasi-automatically, even when it is more
effective to ignore one another. 
Several  researchers  have  also  suggested
that joint attention provides a basic mechanism
for sharing representations of objects and events
and  thus  for  creating  a  perceptual  common
ground in joint action (Tomasello & Carpenter
2007; Tollefsen 2005). To act jointly, it is often
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necessary not only that the co-agents identify
the objects to be acted upon, their location as
well  as the location of  possible  obstacles,  but
also be mutually aware that they do. Joint at-
tention may thus play an important role in en-
suring  that  co-agents  track  the  same  objects
and features of the situation and be mutually
aware that they do. In a recent study,  Böckler
et al. (2011) showed that attending to objects
together  from  opposite  perspectives  makes
people adopt an allocentric rather than the de-
fault  egocentric  frame of  reference.  These  au-
thors  suggest  that  taking an allocentric  refer-
ence may support the efficiency of joint actions
from  different  spatial  orientations.  Independ-
ently of mutual manifestness, being able to as-
sess what others are perceiving, or can or can-
not perceive at a given moment in  time may
also  facilitate  coordination.  For  instance,  a
study by Brennan and colleagues (Brennan et
al. 2007) demonstrated that co-agents in joint
visual  search  space  were  able  to  distribute  a
common space between them by directing their
attention  depending  on  where  the  other  was
looking and that their joint search performance
was thus  much more efficient  than their  per-
formance in an individual version of the search
task. 
There  are,  however,  important  limita-
tions to what these emergent and planned on-
line coordination processes can achieve. First,
to the extent that they exploit perceptual in-
formation, they can be of no help unless a cer-
tain  amount  of  common perceptual  informa-
tion is indeed available to co-agents. Second,
even when common perceptual information is
available,  there  are  limits  to  our  processing
capacities. An agent may be able to simultan-
eously  track  what  a  small  number  of  other
agents are currently doing or attending to, but
when the number of agents increases, this ca-
pacity soon finds its  limits.  Our  capacity to
co-represent the actions, goals, and intentions
of other agents we observe acting encounters
similar  limitations.  Understanding  of  actions
through motor resonance and mirroring works
only to the extent that the observed actions
are  part  of  the  action  repertoire  of  the  ob-
server.  Similarly,  when  actions  are  relatively
novel, agents may not yet have formed suffi-
ciently  detailed  shared  task  representations.
Finally, unexpected effects of action execution
or failures of coordination may reveal various
forms of misalignment between partners’ rep-
resentations or indicate that their representa-
tions, though aligned, were inaccurate. 
When  pre-alignment  is  insufficient  or
breakdowns occur due to misalignment in the
action execution phase, the deliberate and con-
scious  production  of  social  signals  aimed  at
aligning  or  realigning  relevant  representations
becomes crucial. Agents cannot count on align-
ment arising spontaneously. They have to make
it happen. Intentional communication, whether
verbal or not, is then needed to make it happen.
As  emphasized  by  Herbert Clark (2006),
joint activities can typically be partitioned into
two sets of actions: a basic joint activity and co-
ordinating joint actions. The basic joint activity
comprises all the actions essential to achieving the
basic joint goal, while the coordinating joint ac-
tions consists in the set of communicative acts
about the basic activities that insure relevant rep-
resentational alignment. To study this partition-
ing of joint activities, Clark and his co-workers
ushered two people in a small room, gave them
the parts of a kit for a TV stand and asked them
to assemble the stand, videotaping them and re-
cording their verbal exchanges while putting they
did it. Here’s a short extract of their exchanges,
taken from Clark (2006, p. 128):
Ann Should we put this in, this, this little like
kinda cross bar, like the T? like the I bar? 
Burton Yeah ((we can do that)) 
Ann So, you wanna stick the ((screws in)).
Or wait is, is, are these these things, or? 
Burton That’s these things I bet. Because
there’s no screws. 
Ann Yeah, you’re right. Yeah, probably. If
they’ll stay in. 
Burton I don’t know how they’ll  stay in
((but)) 
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Ann Right there. 
Burton Is this one big enough? 
Ann Oh ((xxx)) I guess cause like there’s
no other side for it to come out. 
Burton M-hm. 
[8.15 sec] 
Burton ((Now let’s do this one)) 
Ann Okay
First, it should be noted that, as often happens
in daily life, this joint activity was not planned
in advance. Instead, Ann and Burton discover
that  they  have  to  assemble  a  TV stand  and
work out together what they should do as they
go along.  Second,  Clark points  out  that  Ann
and  Burton’s  coordinating  joint  actions  are
structured  in  what  he  calls  projective  pairs,
comprising a proposal and an uptake (i.e., full
acceptance,  altered  acceptance  or  rejection  of
proposal). Third, the exchanges can be gestural
as  well  as verbal.  For instance, instead of,  or
concomitantly  with,  asking  verbally  whether
Burton is ready to fasten the screws, Ann may
present him with the screwdriver and his taking
it count as acceptance. Fourth, the contents of
these exchanges show that they are aimed at re-
ducing instrumental uncertainty. Typically, they
are about what should be done and how, who
should do what, and when and where it should
be  done.  When  the  task  presents  difficulties,
they may also serve to reduce motivational un-
certainty.  For  instance,  Burton  might  ask
whether they should give it a last try and Ann
either acquiesce or reject the proposal. Finally,
the structure of the projective pairs shows that
at the same time they aim at reducing common
ground uncertainty. Proposals are about poten-
tial  alignments  and  full  acceptance  confirms
alignment and common ground. Tellingly, with
altered  acceptance  uptakes,  projective  pairs
evolve into projective triads, the third element
of the exchange being the proposer’s uptake on
the alteration. 
Importantly,  to  negotiate  and  achieve
alignment in this way, we must be aware of our
own and others’ intentions and beliefs and this
at two levels, corresponding to the two sides of
the partitioning characterized by Clark. On the
one hand,  it  is  essential  to  the  fulfillment  of
communicative  intentions  that  they  be  recog-
nized as such by the addressee (Grice 1957; Re-
canati 1986;  Sperber &  Wilson 1986). On the
other hand, what agents communicate in these
contexts is information about their beliefs and
intentions regarding the joint action. This sug-
gests that the development of self-consciousness
and consciousness of other minds, of intentional
communication,  and  of  increasingly  complex
forms  of  coordinated  joint  action  go  hand  in
hand. 
The success of  both individual and joint
action  depends  on  representational  alignment.
In the case of individual action, representation
alignment  takes  two  main  forms.  First,  at  a
given  level  of  action  specification,  a  match
should be achieved between representations of
desired, predicted and actual states. We can call
this  first  form  of  alignment  intra-level  align-
ment. Second, inter-level alignment is also ne-
cessary; that is, despite differences in represent-
ational  format and resources,  action specifica-
tions at different levels of the action representa-
tion hierarchy should be kept aligned. Conscious
online control may be needed to restore align-
ment when severe intra- or inter-level discrepan-
cies occur. However, it may be argued that in
the individual case alignments are taking place
within a single cognitive system and that this
system  is  normally  sufficiently  integrated  or
unified that serious misalignments are rare and
thus that the need for online conscious control
is limited. 
The  main  difference  between  individual
and  joint  actions  lies  in  the  coordination  de-
mands essential  to joint action. Thus, a third
form of representational alignment becomes cru-
cial in joint action. In addition to individual in-
tra-and  inter-level  representational  alignment,
inter-agent representational alignment is neces-
sary to meet coordination demands. Inter-agent
alignment may be achieved in part through ad-
vanced planning,  as  proposed  by Bratman.  It
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can  also  be  achieved  in  part  through  online
emergent and planned coordination processes of
the types explored and described in the recent
psychological literature. However, there are im-
portant limitations to what these coordination
processes can achieve. Advance planning, when
it takes place, may help define a shared back-
ground framework for the joint action, but at
this stage it is typically impossible to anticipate
all the coordination demands that will arise at
the  execution  stage.  Some  of  these  demands
may be met by the kinds of online coordination
processes reviewed earlier in this section, but, as
I pointed out, there are also important limita-
tions  to  what  they  can  achieve.  In  many in-
stances,  the  progress  of  a  joint  action  is
hindered or the action breaks down due to vari-
ous forms of misalignment between agents’ rep-
resentations. In such instances, individual cor-
rections do not suffice to put the joint action
back on track. Rather, to overcome these fail-
ures, agents need to align or realign their rep-
resentations. This process calls for what Clark
calls coordinating joint actions, that is, commu-
nicative  acts  about  the  basic  joint  activity.
These  communicative  acts  in  turn  are  inten-
tional  and aim at  communicating  information
about the agents’ intentions and beliefs with a
view to  achieve  alignment.  But  one  can only
communicate  intentionally  about  one’s  beliefs
and intentions  if  one  is  aware  of  them.  Con-
versely, one can only understand the communic-
ative acts  of  other  agents if  one realizes  that
these agents have a capacity for intentions. Fi-
nally  and crucially,  as  already emphasized by
Velleman (2007) in his discussion of Bratman’s
account, intentions could not serve their prag-
matic  functions  unless  they  also  had  an  epi-
stemic role. In other words, if my having the in-
tention to A didn’t count as a form of practical
self-knowledge  and didn’t  give me grounds to
believe that I would act as intended, my com-
municating (sincerely) about my intention to A
would not license other agents to form beliefs
about  my future  actions  and thus  would  not
yield  the  kind  of  inter-agent  representational
alignment needed to achieve coordination.
To recap, joint actions create more com-
prehensive demands for  representational  align-
ment than individual actions, since their success
depends not just on individual intra- and inter-
level  representational  alignment  but  also  on
inter-agent representational alignment. New re-
sources are needed to meet these demands. On
the social creation myth proposed here, a capa-
city for conscious intentions is crucial to inter-
agent  representational  alignment.  Having  con-
scious  intentions  allows  us  to  communicate
about them and engage in coordinating joint ac-
tions that create common ground and promote
the success of basic joint activity. The answer
this myth offers to the question what is the pur-
pose of conscious intentions is then that it is to
enable more efficient inter-personal coordination
in joint action and thus reap the benefits that
come  with  increasingly  complex  and  flexible
forms  of  coordinated  actions.  The  social  cre-
ation myth doesn’t deny intentions an epistemic
role. On the contrary, it acknowledges that in-
tentions couldn’t serve their  inter-personal co-
ordination function if they did not at the same
time provide us with a form of self-knowledge.
However,  it  views  their  epistemic  function  as
subservient to their coordination function. The
social creation myth does not deny either that
conscious  intentions  play  a  role  in  the  online
control of individual action. Rather, it proposes
that conscious control of individual action may
be a by-product of a capacity for conscious con-
trol that became established in social contexts
because of  the role  it  served in  solving inter-
agent coordination problems and because of the
benefit conferred by the forms of cooperation it
made possible.
6 Conclusion: Relating creation myths
The  Bratmanian  creation  myth  is  pragmatic
but also diachronic and individualist. Intentions
have a purpose or teleofunction. This function is
pragmatic insofar as the main benefit attached
to intentions is to allow us to secure greater de-
sire satisfaction. The way intentions secure this
benefit  is  by allowing us to organize  and co-
ordinate  our  actions  diachronically,  in  other
words to become planning agents. As noted by
Velleman, this emphasis of diachronicity and fu-
ture-directed  intentions  leaves  present-directed
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intentions without a clear function. Finally, this
myth is to a large extent individualist.  While
planning  agency  also  enables  inter-individual
coordination, the social dimension of intentions
remains  secondary  in  Bratman’s  account  and
again  his  main  concern  is  with  diachronically
organized joint actions. 
While  the social  creation myth also sees
intentions  as  having  a  pragmatic  purpose,  in
contrast to the Bratmanian myth, it emphasizes
the social and synchronous dimension of inten-
tions. Instead of self-coordination over time, it
emphasizes cooperation and flexibly coordinated
joint action as the main route to greater desire
satisfaction.  It  thus  reverses  the  Bratmanian
perspective in proposing that intentions are de-
signed to enable a more efficient online coordin-
ation of joint action and in considering future-
directed individual or joint planning as derivat-
ive or secondary functions of intentions.
Because its main emphasis is on synchron-
icity rather  than diachronicity,  the social  cre-
ation myth has no problem attributing a prag-
matic control function to present-directed inten-
tions. It is thus impervious to one of the attrac-
tions  of  the  Anscombian  creation  myth.  We
need  feel  no  temptation  to  attribute  an  epi-
stemic  function  to  present-directed  intentions
for lack of any other plausible option. The so-
cial creation myth, however, does not dispense
with  epistemic  functions  altogether,  quite  the
reverse. Not only is the fact that intentions em-
body a form of self-knowledge essential to their
role in the coordination of joint actions, but in
addition the way intentions play their coordin-
ative role is by contributing to the alignment of
representations with co-agents and thus to the
production of shared knowledge. Thus, on the
social creation myth, the epistemic function of
intentions is  not just to provide us with self-
knowledge about our intentions and actions, it
is also to contribute to the formation of shared
knowledge.  However,  the  social  creation  myth
remains closer to the pragmatic than to the epi-
stemic  creation  myth  in  considering  that  the
epistemic function of intentions is ancillary to
its pragmatic purpose. 
Finally, is the social creation myth a tele-
ological  myth  or,  like  Velleman’s  myth,  the
story of a spandrel? I must admit that I am not
sure  what  the  answer  to  this  question  is  or
should be. Indeed, this was one of the reasons
why I chose to call my story a creation myth.
One thing is sure though, if it is a story about a
spandrel, this spandrel is not the same as Velle-
man’s. His spandrel is a by-product of curiosity
and self-awareness. This spandrel, if  it is one,
would involve a third element, sociality or co-
operativeness.  Social  theories  of  consciousness
(Frith 2010; Graziano & Kastner 2011) propose
that consciousness has evolved to facilitate so-
cial interactions and enhance social cooperation.
On the one hand, a capacity for consciousness is
of course a much more general capacity than a
capacity for conscious intentions and this may
suggest that the latter, as a by-product of this
more general capacity, is itself merely a span-
drel. On the other hand, if the ultimate purpose
of  consciousness  is  to  enhance social  coopera-
tion,  then  conscious  intentions  are  a  key  ele-
ment in making this possible and calling our ca-
pacity for intention a spandrel would fail to do
justice to their role.
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